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SUMMARY 
This short dissertation is an appraisal of same-sex marriages. The traditional arguments against 
same-sex unions are examined and rejected as being circular, unconvincing and baseless. Some 
of the international developments on the subject of same-sex unions are examined and it is noted 
that a slow but distinct change in attitude towards same-sex marriages is beginning to emerge 
from international judiciaries. The legal position of people with same-sex orientation in the 
South African legal system is examined with special reference to our Constitution. It is 
submitted that our Constitution is the foremost vehicle for legal change in this regard and that 
the equality clause of our Constitution is authority for the recognition by the law of same-sex 
marriages. This dissertation concludes that same-sex marriages ought to be fully accepted and 
recognised by the law for reasons, inter aha, of fairness and equality for people of same-sex 
orientation. 
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We believe in a God who says, "'Behold I am making all things new." We are heirs of 
a Judeo-Cbristian history which is characterised by a continual Exodus into new-found 
freedom. We live under the promises of a new Testament and a new Covenant, a new 
Heaven and a new earth, a new commandment, a new song, and a new life. 
P.K. THOMAS 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
In the huge diversity of peoples who make up the human race, there are a number of universal 
constants which have always been part of the human condition. One is that people who are 
different inspire fear which often leads to prejudice; another is that a proportion of the human 
race is homosexual. 1 During the nineteenth century much was written about lesbians and gays 
throughout the world. Psychiatrists, doctors, judges, politicians and the clergy seem to have 
known very well who ''the homosexual" was and what "he" was like. They wrote books, reports 
and expert opinions about the characteristics of "the homosexual~', about bis perversions, bis 
diseases and his sins. The sources they used for their research were psychological, medical or 
juridical "cases" which were written from the assumption that homosexuality was abnormal. 2 
Their dubious "evaluations" combined with their prejudices and their results were presented as 
scientific truth. Hardly anybody in the nineteenth century actually asked lesbians or gays 
themselves what it was like to be gay or lesbian. They were simply objects of what masqueraded 
as scientific research. They were victims of scientific curiosity about the "abnormal" and were 
often abused as objects of projection for irrational fantasies and fears. Lesbians and gays were 
not listened to as subjects and experts on their own lives and specific experiences but used as 
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material for sensational stories. 3 And of course gays and lesbians were prohibited from marrying 
someone of their own sex. 
According to Sinclair4 marriage is traditionally defined (by lawyers) as the legally recognised 
voluntary union for life in common of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others 
while it lasts. It has been said that marriage is one of the most venerable impenetrable 
institutions in modem society, and that it provides the ultimate form of acceptance for personal, 
intimate relationships in our society, and gives those who marry an insider status of the most 
powerful kind. 5 The institution of marriage furthermore secures for heterosexual couples a 
multiplicity of rights and benefits which are generally denied to same-sex couples by virtue of 
their non-admittance to the "institution of marriage" with each other. According to Simpson6 
all lesbians and gays are born innocent of the knowledge that the natural lives which lie ahead 
of them have already, for centuries, been "legislated" against. The laws against this minority 
are not only unjust but also unreasonable. The ideology of heterosexism, says Wolhuter, 7 
naturalizes the gendered roles within the traditional nuclear family and necessitates the gender 
specificity of marriage by coupling it with the aim of procreation. Sexual relations that do not 
conform to this traditional model are rendered deviant. Homosexual orientation is therefore 
distorted by heterosexual ideology and recharacterized as immoral or pathological. 8 
According to Retief9 the Nationalist Government "discovered" the gay subculture in the latter 
half of the l 960's and, in a flurry of panic, proceeded to launch a vigorous legislative campaign 
against it. Retief states10 that the then Minister of Justice told the House of Assembly in 1967 
that, if unchecked, homosexuality would bring about the utter ruin of civilization in South 
Africa. 
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Social opprobrium towards gays and lesbians remain very much in evidence today in spite of the 
fact that homosexuality is a part of our society, is becoming increasingly visible, and is here to 
stay. 
As with racism and sexism. prejudice and discrimination against lesbians and gay men is a 
violation of human rights. It is a form of oppression because it does not just affect individuals, 
but results from the way in which society is structured. 
The evolutionary nature of family law requires that the law keep pace with societal changes by 
enacting appropriate legislation to suit specific societal requirements. What follows will be a 
short excursus in an effort to answer the questions, firstly, whether our law ought to fully 
recognise same-sex marriages and, secondly, whether our law has indeed advanced to the stage 
where same-sex marriages are now to be regarded as lawful. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SOCIETY'S OBJECTION TO THE IDEA OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
The notion of same-sex marriage is generally frowned upon by society. Some of the popular 
arguments used by society to rationalise its position are the following: 
a) Uomosexuality h A Sin 
This one is by far the most common argument against people with same-sex orientation. 
According to Van der Veen and Dercksen, 11 people persecuted for their sexual 
orientation in the past were known as "sodomites" and ''witches". Such persecution has 
been banned since the eighteenth century, but religious conceptions of homosexuality as 
a sin are still used to justify unequal treatment. It has been noted that the Bible's 
condemnation of homosexual conduct, combined with the total absence of any scriptural 
language approving same-sex marriage, creates an implied negation of same-sex 
marriage that is equally as strong as the Bible's express affirmation of opposite-sex 
marriage. 12 The church has accordingly not been known to officially sanction same-sex 
marriages. 
Narrow-minded judges have also been quick to jump onto the religious bandwagon in 
denouncing homosexual behaviour. For instance in the American case of Bowers v 
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Hardwick13 Judge Burger stated that 
"condemnation of those practices [homosexual conduct] is firmly rooted 
in Jude<rChristian moral and ethical standards." 
Also Judge Peterson in another American case, Baker v Nelson, 14 in which a refusal to 
grant a marriage licence to two men was upheld, stated that 
''the institution of marriage as a union of man and woman ... is as old 
as the book of Genesis." 
However Judge Blackmun in his bold dissenting judgment in the Bowers case stated that 
"the assertion that 'traditional Jud.eo-Christian values proscribe' the 
conduct involved cannot provide an adequate justification for (the 
statutes). That certain, but by no means all, religious groups condemn 
the behaviour at issue gives the state no licence to impose their 
judgments on the entire citizenry. The legitimacy of secular legislation 
depends instead on whether the state can advance some justification for 
its law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine. 1' 
In our ever--changing society, it simply does riot make sense for a state legislature to 
promulgate laws which have as their basis merely ecclesiastical tradition that is two 
thousand years old With the steady stream of gay men and lesbians coming out of the 
closet today, religious institutions are being forced to re-examine their steadfast beliefs 
on the subject of homosexuality and same-sex marriages. 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu has said: 
'i:he Chureh ... far from being inclusive and welcoming of all, bas over 
and over again pushed many to the periphery; instead of being 
hospitable to all, it has made many of God's children outcasts and 
pariahs on the basis of something which, like race or gender, they could 
do nothing about - their sexual orientation. The church has joined the 
world in committing what 1 consider to be the ultimate blasphemy -
making the children of God doubt that they are children of God. 
Lesbians and gays have been made to reject God and, in their rejection 
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of the church. they have been made to question why God created them 
as they were. I have found this official position of the church illogical, 
irrational and frankly un-Christlike, totally untenable."16 
Of course while some religious organisations and authorities are changing their attitudes, 
it can comfortably be postulated that the less enlightened religious organisations will not 
do so for very many generations to come. 
Coupled with the "sin" reasoning is the belief that AIDS has its roots in the gay 
community. According to Lamont, 17 
"in ignorance of the epidemiological f.acts of HIV I AIDS it became 
common for the conservative religious movement to blame homosexuals 
for this new disease and in fact to declare that it was God's judgment on 
an abhorrent and perverted lifestyle. God had finally acted against the 
rise of the gay movement and the decay of family values by punishing 
these communities with a new plague." 
However lesbians were conveniently ignored in this argument, implying that God 
approved of their behaviour. As a category of persons, lesbians are quite easily one of 
the lowest risk groups for the transmission of the virus. Furthermore the fact that 
thousands ofheterosexual people in mostly African countries were also dying of AIDS-
related diseases was also ignored. 18 
Lamont19 states further that the media's irresponsible reporting and the conservative 
church's proclamation of God's judgment on the gay community have effectively spread 
a message world .. wide that AIDS and gay men are synonymous. The result of years of 
this misinformation has infected thousands of people who thought that being 
heterosexual created an immunity from infection. 
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Although the origins of the AIDS pandemic is uncertain, what is certain is that it affects 
heterosexuals and homosexuals alike.20 It is only the naive and uninformed who still 
believe that the homosexual community is responsible for the out-break of the disease. 
AIDS is not God's judgment on an "abhorrent" and "perverted" lifestyle and AIDS can 
no longer be regarded as a gay plague. 
b) Various State Interests 
According to Gray21 various state interests have been articulated as policy reasons why 
same-sex marriages should not be recognised and the premise upon which this 
justification rests is that the state has a compelling interest in promoting heterosexual 
marriage and prohibiting same-sex marriage. Gray22 goes on to state that the interests 
of the state include encouraging procreation, preserving the traditional family unit, and 
encouraging morality. 
(i) Procreation 
In the American case of Skinner v Oklahomd-3 it was said that 
"the state has a basic interest in encouraging reproduction 
because procreation is fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race." 
In upholding the denial of a marriage licence to two men, the Appeal Court of 
Washington in Singer v Hara 24 stated: 
"the state's refusal to grant a licence allowing the [two men] to 
marry one another ... is based upon the state's recognition that 
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our society as a whole views marriage as the appropriate and 
desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of children." 
The court's reasoning amounts to a logical fallacy as there is no requirement in 
law that a pre-requisite for marriage be that the parties have the ability to have 
children. and neither are married couples bound by law to have children. Indeed 
many heterosexual couples are childless, due either to their inability to have 
children or simply to their choice. 
The Singer judgment, is furthermore based on the incorrect premise that same-
sex couples cannot have children. In reality, same-sex couples can and do have 
and/or rear children via alternative medical and legal means, like artificial 
insemination. 25 
(ii) Preserving The Traditional Family Unit 
According to Lind26 the view that marriage is traditionally a heterosexual 
institution and that it, together with the kind of family that it encourages, is of 
central importance to the state, fails to understand the diversity of family life to 
be fmmd in society. Of course the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging 
and preserving the stability of the family. According to Lind, ~7 however, 
protection by the state of only the ''traditional" family is wrong. Lind feels that 
the state's recognition of a homosexual family norm will do little to undermine 
the traditional status of its heterosexual counterpart. Gray also holds this view: 
"[G]iven the increase in cohabitation and divorce as well as 
other social changes since the l960's, a narrow interpretation of 
the family unit would not reflect the realities of contemporary 
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society. "28 
Gray therefore concludes by saying that 
"ignoring the homosexual family does not negate its actual 
existence, but only works to burden and devalue it This neglect 
by the legal system perpetuates negative and false notions about 
homosexuals and their relationships. By acting as if they do not 
and cannot exist, the implication is that homosexual 
relationships and families do not and cannot provide an 
environment of emotional and psychological care and love 
worthy of recognition. Penalizing homosexual cohabiters in an 
effort to preserve traditional families is arbitrary and unfair."29 
(iii) Preserving The Morality Of The Majority 
The argument against same-sex marriages in some quarters has its basis in the 
encouragement and protection of the morality of the majority. Of course the 
premise here is once again that homosexuality is immoral and that society at 
large needs to be protected from its pervasive corrupting influence. Hence the 
litany of anti-homosexual laws including sodomy laws, exclusions of 
homosexuals from the military, prohibitions against child custody and others 
which abound throughout the world Dworkin30 has written that: 
"even if it is true that most [people] think homosexuality an 
abominable vice and cannot tolerate its presence, it remains 
possible that this common opinion is a compound of prejudice, 
... rationalization ... and personal aversion . . . . It remains 
possible that the ordinary [person] could produce no reason for 
his view, he would simply parrot his neighbour . . . . If so, the 
principles of democracy ... do not call for the enforcement of 
the consensus, for the belief that prejudices, personal aversions 
and rationalizations do not justify restricting another's freedom 
itself occupies a critical and fundamental position in our 
popular morality." 
Generally, the promotion of morality in any society is to be welcomed However, 
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when this is directed at the suppression of a minority class of persons like people 
of same-sex orientation, on ill-conceived bases, then it amounts to unjust 
discrimination plain and simple. There is no evidence of whatever nature that 
heterosexual behaviour is any more or less moral than homosexual behaviour. 
c) Homosexuality As A Disease Or Abnormality 
According to Van der Veen & Dercksen31 the belief that homosexuality is a disease is 
not only a deeply rooted conviction but was, until recently, officially accepted. 
Homosexuality was listed as a disease in all the major classifications, including the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) of the World Heath Organisation. Same-
sex love came to be seen as a psychiatric deformation aftlicting certain people only, who 
need to be cured. Furthermore, biased studies of group behaviour further acknowledged 
the conception of homosexuality as a deviation.32 
Van der Veen & Dercksen33 go on to state that with the medicalization of 
homosexuality, homosexual men and women were further stigmatised, to such an extent 
that many societies found it appropriate to legalise this stigma. Some people feared 
openness about homosexuality on the assumption that homosexuality was contagious. 
Open homosexuals would cause others, specifically children, to become homosexual. 34 
Van der Veen & Dercksen35 state further that it was not until the late 1950's that large 
scale studies of non-patient homosexuals proved that homosexuality was not limited to 
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patients and lesbians and gay men were as capable as heterosexuals of leading a normal 
life. Gradually the idea began to take hold that homosexuality was a simple variation of 
affection and sexuality. However, many people still see homosexuality as a mental 
disease or a biological deviation. Many politicians and religious leaders nowadays use 
the mental illness model to justify their negative views on homosexuality. 36 
d) Physical And Psycholo&ieal Harm to Children 
The theory is sometimes expressed without any factual basis that the danger exists that, 
being left alone with the child, the gay parent will sexually molest him or her. Added 
to this is the possibility that friends of the parent or visitors may engage in such activity. 
This is nothing more than a myth based on ignorance. According to Lind37 the vast 
majority of people involved in the sexual abuse of children are heterosexual men who 
live "traditional" family lives. Lind38 goes on to say that homosexual couples who 
undertake legal parenting responsibilities are unlikely to jeopardize their hard-won status 
by abusing their children. 
According to Lind39 the concern that exposure to a homosexual lifestyle prejudices the 
social development of children is also insupportable, on two separate grounds. The first 
is empirical. What little research has been conducted into the family lives of adult 
homosexuals indicates that their children show no significant deviation in respect of their 
development (and particularly their gender-role identity) from that of children reared in 
single parent households. 
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The second is simply logical, continues Lind. 40 Heterosexual children who are reared to 
view homosexuality as an acceptable alternative to heterosexuality are not, as a 
consequence of their upbringing, any more likely to be "converted" to homosexuality 
than are children reared in homosexual households likely to be "converted" to 
heterosexuality. 41 
On the issue of children suffering torment by friends as a result of having homosexual 
parents, Lind42 argues that justifying a prejudice by reference to the prejudice itself 
cannot be an acceptable basis for pursuing discrimination of this kind If homosexual 
parenting were legally acceptable, the source of ridicule itself would be significantly 
eroded by the increase of its social occurrence. Lind43 argues further that the most 
obvious parallel would be the prevention of mixed-raced marriages on the grounds that 
children would be ridiculed as ''racial outcasts". Lind sounds the warning that South 
African history should warn us about proceeding along this path. 44 The prejudice is 
traditional but irrational and unjustifiable. 
The image of the gay parent is that of a frivolous pleasure seeker. However according 
to Bonthuys45 modem psychological research indicates that a parent's parenting skills 
are not necessarily affected by his or her sexual orientation. Furthermore, the research 
shows that children raised by homosexual parents are not necessarily likely to become 
homosexuals themselves.46 Most people who are homosexual were born and raised by 
heterosexual people and surrounded by heterosexual role models as they were growing 
up. There is accordingly no reason to believe that gay parents could succeed in making 
a child gay even if they wanted to.47 A child's interests is best served by the quality of 
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its upbringing and not by the sexual orientation of its parents. With the equality of the 
sexes now a forgone conclusion, little distinction is drawn between the maternal and 
paternal roles in a family. It can now no longer be said that a woman's place is in the 
kitchen and in the bedroom. There is therefore absolutely no reason why a man cannot 
play an equally effective maternal role, and a woman an equally effective paternal role 
to a growing child Indeed in the recent case of Van der Linde v Van der Linde, 48 in a 
child custody dispute, one of the enquiries to be addressed was whether the quality of a 
parental role was determined by gender. In expressing the enlightened view that the 
quality of a parental role is not simply determined by gender, the court voiced the view 
that the concept of 'mothering' which assumes the showing of unconditional love 
without necessarily expecting anything in return, is not just a component of a woman but 
also part of a man's being. 49 There can accordingly be no necessary connection between 
being gay and being a good or bad parent Neither does sexual orientation in any way 
reflect on parental abilities. There accordingly exists no basis for generalising that 
homosexuals make bad parents. 
CONCLUSION 
In 1987 in South Africa the committee for Social Affairs of the Tri.camera! President's 
Council issued a "Report on the Youth of South Africa" in which homosexuality was 
categorised as part of a general problem of promiscuity (along with "extra-marital sexual 
intercourse", "prostitution" and "living together"). 50 Homosexuality was classed as an 
"acquired behavioural pattern" and "a serious social deviation" which was damned as 
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"irreconcilable with normal marriage". In the committee's "evaluation and findings" it 
classified homosexuality as something by which "the potential in life" of "thousands of 
young people" was "being destroyed": 
"[T]here is cause for concern about the promising young people 
who fall prey to these evils [that is, inter alia, homosexuality] and 
have little chance of tasting the joys of achievements and of the 
realisation of one's own potential." 51 
According to Thomas52 homosexuality has been called an "affliction of the body", a 
''twist of the mind", and a ''cancer of the soul". Yet same-sex orientation is not a habit, 
like smoking, which can be acquired but broken again if the will is strong. 53 Nor is it a 
disease or vice which can be contracted or spread through association. Instead it is a 
condition, like having red hair or being left-handed, which persons do not choose and 
cannot change without harmful psychological consequences. 54 Because people have 
tended to be pre-occupied with the narrowly genital aspect of gay or lesbian lives, they 
have ignored the much more important psychological feelings and emotions which 
comprise the homosexual temperament. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SOME INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS ON FAMUX LAW IN RELATION IO 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGES 
With the-exception of countless international academic articles calling for the equal treatment 
of people with same-sex orientation, the law and courts of other countries have generally 
displayed a lack of enthusiasm for such changes. Where developments and changes have 
occurred, they have been slow and almost hesitant. However the developments that have 
occurred are very encouraging. A distinct progressiveness in this area of family law can 
accordingly be anticipated. 
What follows is an examination of some of the developments in some of the major first-world 
countries which really ought to be leading the world in developing the law in this field. 
a) Ib.e United States of America 
Although the case of Bowers v Hardwick'5 did not deal specifically with the issue of 
same-sex marriage, and although the court's decision became a major stumbling block 
for the gay rights movement the powerful dissenting judgment in this case is much more 
progressive, and indeed has even been preferred and its reasoning followed in similar 
cases in South Africa. 56 
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Here Hardwick challenged the constitutionality of the state of Georgia's sodomy laws 
in the Supreme Court. His challenge was rejected. In his dissenting judgment Judge 
Blackmun stated, inter alia, 
"only the most wilful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual 
intimacy is a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to 
family life, community welfare and the development of human 
personality. The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant 
way through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in 
a nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many 'right' ways of 
conducting these relationships, and that much of the richness of a 
relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the 
form and nature of those intensely personal bonds .... The court claims 
that its decision today merely refuses to recognise a fundamental right 
to engage in homosexual sodomy; what the court really has refused to 
recognise is the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling 
the nature of their intimate associations with others .... "57 
Judge Blackmun concluded as follows: 
"I can only hope that the court soon will reconsider its analysis and 
conclude that depriving individuals of the right to choose for themselves 
how to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far greater threat to 
the values most deeply rooted in our nation's history than tolerance of 
non-conformity could ever do. Because I think the court today betrays 
those values, I dissent. "58 
In the earlier decision of People v Onofre59 the New York Court of Appeals ruled that 
New York's sodomy law violated the United States constitution. The sodomy law at 
issue prohibited sodomy by unmarried people, a classification which the court found to 
violate the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right of privacy 
of the Federal Constitution. The court's decision focused on the rights of unmarried 
couples. The court showed no interest in differentiating between homosexual and 
heterosexual activity; rather, it generated a rule granting a right of privacy to both forms 
of coupling. Whereas the Court of Appeals expanded the right of privacy, the Supreme 
Court in Bowers eventually chose to constrict it. 
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In the case of In re Adoption of Robert Paul P.60 the court ruled that the attempt by a 
man to adopt his gay partner for financial, economic, and emotional reason was invalid. 
According to Arsenault61 this is an important case in the development of the court's 
same-sex coupling jurisprudence for two reasons. First, in this decision the court 
recognised the special needs of gay and lesbian partners for security and predictability 
in their financial affairs, especially in terms of property acquired jointly during their life 
together. Whereas the Onofre decision recognised the right of privacy in the homosexual 
relationship, the present case recognised the need for a right to acquire and pass on 
property. Second, the court left the. door wide open, it indeed extended an invitation, to 
the legislature to create an institution other than adoption that would lend lesbian and 
gay relationships a "non-matrimonial legal status". 
The next major case to advance the cause of people of same-sex orientation was that of 
Braschi v Stahl Associate?- This was a case in which an unmarried partner asked 
whether he could succeed to his deceased' partner's rights in a rent-controlled apartment. 
According to Arsenault63 the court here discussed the purpose of rent-controlled laws 
to prevent coercive bargaining by landlords after a tenant's partner's death. Although 
the court could have stopped there, it continued instead to examine the relationship 
between Braschi and his partner. The court created a textbook of family characteristics, 
discussing long-term relationships characterized by an emotional and financial 
commitment and interdependence.64 The court looked at the manner in which Braschi 
and his partner conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to society, the 
reliance placed upon one another, and the totality of the relationship as evidenced by 
dedication, caring and self-sacrifice. 65 
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In finding in Braschi' s favour the court recognised the sweeping societal, governmental, 
policy and fiscal implications of this broad definition of family. The court, in extending 
its gradual recognition of the rights of same-sex partners developed in Onofre and Robert 
Paul P., had finally granted same-sex couples recognition as family, at least for some 
purposes. 
American courts have also been called upon to deal with the issue of same-sex coupling 
in the following less controversial contexts. It is submitted that these contexts are 
extremely relevant to family law generally and in fact are inextricably linked to the issue 
of same-sex marriage. The advances made in these contexts strengthen the acceptance 
of same-sex unions generally and make the case for the attainment of "legal" status for 
same-sex marriage far more realistic: 
• Bottoms v Bottoms~ where the court awarded custody of a child to her lesbian 
mother, overturning the lower court's decision awarding custody to the child's 
grandmother, 
• Jn re Guardianship of Kowalski,61 where the court awarded guardianship of a 
woman to her lesbian partner rather than the woman's biological family after an 
accident left the woman severely brain-damaged; 
• In re Adoption of Caitlin,68 where the court allowed lesbian partners to adopt 
each other's biological children; 
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• Commonwealth v Wassan,69 where Kentucky's sodomy statute was overturned 
as an invasion of privacy. 
One of the most recent and celebrated American decisions is the Hawaiian case of Baehr 
v Lewin.'0 Here the applicants, whose applications for marriage licences were denied 
solely on the ground that they were of the same sex, filed a complaint alleging that the 
denial of the licences violated their right to privacy and equal protection as guaranteed 
by the Hawaii Constitution. When the action failed in the First Circuit Court, the 
applicants appealed to the Hawaiian Supreme Court. 
The main question facing the court was whether the existing boundaries of the 
fundamental right of marriage could be extended to include same-sex couples. The court 
adopted the principle set by Judge Goldberg in a 1965 judgment71 where he observed 
that 
"judges 'determining which rights are fimdamental' must look not to 
'personal and private notions', but to the 'traditions and (collective) 
conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is so rooted 
(there) ... as to be ranked as fundamental. The inquiry is whether a 
right involved is of such a character that it cannot be denied without 
violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at 
the base of all our civil and political institutions . . . "72 
Applying the foregoing principle, the Baehr court found that "the right to same-sex 
marriage was not so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of the Hawaiian 
people that a failure to recognise it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty 
and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. "73 The court 
eventually decided that the applicants did not have a fundamental constitutional right to 
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same-sex mamage. 
However the court decided further thatthe basis of the refusal by the relevant authorities 
to grant the applicants their licence to marry deprived them of access to a multiplicity 
of rights and benefits that are contingent upon "married" status. 74 This violated the equal 
protection clause of the Hawaiian Constitution. Article 1, Section 5 of the Hawaii 
constitution provides that 
.. no person shall ... be denied the equal protection of the laws. nor be 
denied the enjoyment of the person• s civil rights or be discriminated 
against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex, or 
ancestry."75 
The court therefore stated that by its plain language, the Hawaii Constitution prohibits 
state-sanctioned discrimination against any person in the exercise of his or her civil 
rights on the basis of sex. 
In terms of the Hawaiian Constitution a "strict scrutiny" analysis is applied to laws which 
classify on the basis of suspect categories or which impinges upon fundamental rights 
expressly or impliedly granted by the Constitution. 76 In such a case the law would be 
presumed to be unconstitutional unless the state shows a compelling state interest which 
justifies such a classification and also that the laws are narrowly drawn to avoid 
unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights. Accordingly a statute restricting the 
marital relationship to a male and female is subject to a strict scrutiny test on an equal 
protection challenge. The Baehr court therefore remanded the matter to enable the 
respondent authority (Lewin) to present evidence in an effort to overcome the 
presumption that the relevant statute upon which he relied in refusing the applicants their 
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marriage license, was unconstitutional. According to W olhuter77 in the subsequent 
decision in Baehr v Miike78 the respondent's attempt to do so failed for lack of evidence. 
The court accordingly concluded that the Hawaii marriage legislation was 
unconstitutional. 79 In the course of its judgment the court, relying on the considerable 
amount of American social-science research that was available on the issue, 80 found as 
follows: 
i) the single most important factor in the development of a happy, healthy and well-
adjusted child is the nurturing relationship between parent and child~ 81 
ii) gay and lesbian parents and same-sex couples can be as fit and loving parents, as 
non-gay men and women and different-sex couples~ 82 
iii) while children of gay and lesbian parents may experience symptoms of stress and 
other issues related to their non-traditional family structure, the available 
scientific data, studies and clinical experience ... suggest that children of gay 
and lesbian parents ... tend to adjust and develop in a normal fashion~ 83 
iv) if same-sex marriage is allowed, the children being raised by gay or lesbian 
parents . . . may be assisted, because they may obtain certain protections and 
benefits (emotional and financial) that come with or become available as a result 
of marriage. 84 
The court accordingly found that it had not been proved that the public interest in the 
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well-being of children and families, or the optimal development of children will be 
adversely affected by same-sex marriage. 85 
b) Canada 
Until quite recently, homosexuals in Canada were legally invisible and subject to 
considerable discrimination and societal antagonism. 86 According to Bala 87 homosexuals 
have recently however become increasingly visible, gaining at least some degree of 
social acceptance and seeking recognition and protection through the political process 
and in the courts. In 1977 Quebec became the first province to make sexual orientation 
a prohibited basis of discrimination. By 1992, five other Canadian jurisdictions had 
added this category to their human rights legislation. 88 
In terms of section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
"every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination 
based on race, national OT ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex. age OT 
mental or physical disability."' 
Although sexual orientation is not specifically mentioned in the Charter, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal in Haig v Canadd"9 considered whether the absence of sexual 
orientation from the list of proscribed grounds of discrimination in section 3 of the 
Canadian Human Rights Act was discriminatory and contrary to section 15. The factual 
context of the case concerned the dismissal of a Canadian Armed Forces Officer on the 
basis of his sexual orientation. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that the requisite 
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degree of social disadvantage to justify inclusion within section 15 was met by the 
category of sexual orientation: 
"The social context which must be considered includes the pain and 
humiliation undergone by homosexuals by reason of prejudice towards 
diem. It also includes die enlightened evolution of human rights social 
and legislative policy in Canada, since the end of the second world war, 
both provincially and federally. The failure to provide an avenue of 
redress for prejudicial treatment of homosexual members of society, and 
the possible inference from die omission that such treatment is 
acceptable, create the effect of discrimination offending section 15(1) 
of the Charter. "90 
The court held that the Canadian Human Rights Act must be interpreted, applied and 
administered as though it contained "sexual orientation" as a prohibited ground of 
discrimination. 
According to Stychin9 t the general approach adopted by the courts and its specific 
application to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation suggests a willingness to 
recognise emergent identities within constitutional discourse and to protect those who 
so identify themselves through the equality guarantees of the Charter. 
While overt discrimination against homosexuals on the basis of their sexual orientation 
is now prohibited, the issue of their familial or spousal status is more controversial. 
According to Bala, 92 Canadian courts have recognised that upon termination of a same-
sex relationship, one partner who has contributed to the acquisition or preservation of 
property by the other may have a claim based on a constructive trust. similar to a person 
in an unmarried heterosexual relationship. The decision of F arrest v Price 93 recognised 
that this contribution might, at least in part, arise through the provision of domestic and 
household services in a relationship the court characterized as committed, caring and 
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loving, tantamount in all respects to a traditional heterosexual marriage. 
In Leschner v Ontario94 the Ontario Human Rights Board of Inquiry ruled that the 
provincial government was obliged to extend "spousal" survivor pension benefits to the 
partners of its homosexual employees. The Board held that because the relevant 
legislation granted rights to persons of the opposite sex living in a "conjugal relationship 
outside of marriage" the failme to make similar provisions for same-sex couples violated 
the Charter of Rights' prohibition against discrimination, which, following Haig v 
Canada, included sexual orientation as a prolnbited category of discrimination. 95 
While Canadian courts are no longer willing to tolerate direct discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation, the majority judgments in Layland v Ontario96 and Egan v 
0JnaddY1 indicate that same-sex partners are having real difficulty in achieving full legal 
recognition of the realities of their relationships. However, both decisions produced 
vigorous dissents, noting the essentially conclusary and circular nature of the majorities' 
reasoning that suggest that judicial attitudes may slowly be changing. 
In Ontario, legislation enacted in 1992 to deal with substituted medical consent provides 
that same-sex partners are spousal equivalents if they have "lived together for at least one 
year and have a close personal relationship that is of primary importance in both persons' 
lives," marking an initial political step toward the statutory recognition of this important 
type of familial relationship. 98 
24 
The Supreme Court of Canada has yet to be called upon to decide whether the exclusion 
of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage is discriminatory. 99 
c) En&Iancl 
With the exception of the Wolfenden Committee report in 1957 which led to the partial 
decriminalization of same-sex sexual acts between men, 100 no significant advances have 
recently been made in English Law on the issue of same-sex unions. The case law in 
England on this point is scant As far back as 1970 the judgment in Corbett v Corbett 101 
set the precedent that marriages were only celebrated between a man and a woman. 
Even the European Court of Justice has relatively recently upheld the principle that 
marriage should be a normal heterosexual relationship. 102 According to Bruns & 
Kannelly the European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, does not recognise the 
concept of a homosexual family and Article 12 of the Convention confers a right to 
marry solely on couples of the opposite sex. 103 Article 12 however appears to be 
contradictory to Article 14 which, according to Bruns & Kannelly, contains an implicit 
ban on discrimination based on sexual orientation. 104 It is hoped that this unfortunate 
discrepancy will be cleared up by the European Court of Justice and that it will change 
its view in favour of same-sex marriages in the not too distant future. 
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d) Other Countries 
i) In terms of contemporary Swedish, Norwegian and Danish law, registered same-
sex partnerships are recognised. According to Wolhuter,105 in terms of the 
Swedish Registered Partnership Act of 1995, identical legal consequences to 
marriage attach to a same-sex partnership, subject to the proviso that registered 
partners may not "jointly or singly adopt children [or] ... be appointed . . . to 
exercise joint custody of a minor" or have children conceived by artificial 
insemination. Thus no parent.al relationship may legally be formed as the result 
of gay partnerships, except in the case where one or both of the partners have 
children from previous heterosexual relationships. No legal relationship between 
a non-parent and a partner's child is permissible. 106 According to Wolhuter the 
Danish Registered Partnership Act of 1989 and the Norwegian Act on Regisrered 
Partnerships for Homosexual Couples of 1993 contain similar provisions. 107 
Pedersen 10' states that the Danish Registered Partnership Act leads to a greater 
degree of equality between homosexuals and heterosexuals because conditions 
for both the legal effects and the dissolution of a registered partnership generally 
correspond to those of marriage. 
ii) The Dutch Supreme Court decided in 1990109 that there had been unjustified 
discrimination against homosexual couples when compared with heterosexual 
couples in respect of the right to marry. To date however the Dutch legislature 
has not been very keen to tackle this subject. In as much as the law does not 
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recognise homosexual. marriages, some local community authorities in the 
Netherlands permit homosexual couples to register a "living together contract". 
Official registration of such a contract does not however, give the couple the 
status of spouses. 110 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DIE SOUTH AFRICAN POSITION 
Even though the Marriage Act no. 25 of 1961 makes no mention of the requirement that spouses 
be of the opposite sex to conclude a legally binding marriage, the requirement that intending 
spouses be of the opposite sex is governed by our common law. Our courts have time and again 
endorsed this requirement For instance in W v w111 Nestadt J stated: 
.. [T]o accede to the argument [that a maniage should be valid if a transsexual is 
found capable of fultilling the essential marriage role of the sex he or she has 
assumed] would be to subvert the requirement of our law that a valid marriage 
requires the parties to be of the opposite sex." 
Nestadt J followed the English decision of Corbett v Corbett112 in this regard. The facts and 
issues in Corbett were largely similar to those in W v W. 
In Simms v Simms113 Howard J followed W v Win confirming that, 
"marriage being the union of a man and a woman, two persons of the same sex 
cannot contract a valid marriage." 
Sinclair114 rightly expresses the view that the traditional legal definition of marriage bas become 
outmoded and unacceptable to a large proportion of the population. She states that it reflects 
neither the law, nor what society is saying and doing. And consequently it can no longer be 
insisted upon. ns 
Both in W v Wand in Simms the court held that a transsexual cannot change his/her original sex. 
Any subsequent marriage by a transsexual to a person of the transsexual's original sex would 
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therefore be void Our law prohibiting same-sex marriages has, however, yet to be challenged 
in court by a couple of same-sex orientation. A same-sex marriage by definition includes a 
sexual relationship of a homosexual nature. Our courts indeed have a long history of naive 
judgments against sexual acts committed especially between males. 116 These judgments serve 
to reflect the negative judicial and legislative attitudes on the subject of same-sex unions 
generally. It is from this daunting homophobic background that the struggle for the recognition 
of same-sex marriages has to emerge. It would appear that some of our judges have not yet been 
cured of their judicial homophobia. The relatively recent decision of Van Rooyen v Van 
Rooyen117 springs to mind Here Judge Flemming decided that a lesbian mother who lived with 
her partner would be sending the "wrong signals,, to her children if they were exposed to her 
lesbian relationship. Here, with respect, Judge Flemming made a moral judgement on 
homosexuality that was clearly baseless and served merely to exhibit his own bias against 
homosexuality. 
In the much more enlightened judgment of Ackerman J in S v H 118 the Judge acknowledged that 
''there is a growing body of opinion . . . which questions fimdamentally the 
sociological. biological. religious and other premises on which the proscription 
of homosexual acts between consenting adult men which takes place in private, 
have traditionally been based." 119 
Having regard to the "changing public attitudes regarding homosexual relationships and self-
expression", 120 the Judge found that a custodial sentence was not an appropriate sentence for 
consensual, adult, private sodomy taking place under circumstances which pose no threat to any 
legitimate societal interest. The Judge was obviously influenced by the fact that in the run-up 
to the Interim Constitution broad consensus developed among role-players on the elimination 
of discrimination against homosexuality, and the strong possibility that this would be entrenched 
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in the future Constitution. Judge Ackennan however could not take the bold step of holding the 
sodomy laws to be discriminatory as the Constitution was not in operation then. 
Homosexual people are currently subject to a plethora of legal restrictions in South African 
law.121 The notorious Sexual Offences Act No. 33 of 1957 criminalizes various forms of sexual 
behaviour between men. As far as the formation of parental relationships is concern~ the 
resort that could be had by gay couples to adoption, artificial insemination, or surrogacy is 
severely restricted 122 In terms of Section 17(a) of the Child Care Act No. 74 of 1983 gay 
couples may not adopt children together. Although they may do so as single individuals, their 
partners may not adopt the child as a "spouse" as envisaged in Section 17( c) of the Act. Legally 
therefore the adopted child would have only one parent. 
According to Lind, 123 
"while becoming a parent is practically fairly easy for lesbians, the law has 
intervened to make it more difficult. No-one who is not a medical practitioner 
may remove or supervise the removal of 'a gamete from the body of a living 
person for the pmpose of the artificial insemination of another living person' .. 
. . Thus self-help insemination is unlawful." 
Lind, 124 further states that 
"surrogacy is the only method available to a gay man hoping for a child who is 
genetically related to him. However surrogacy is fraught with legal difficulty. 
Surrogacy agreements are unlikely to be enforced. The commissioning father 
also does not become the legal parent of the child. In law the surrogate and her 
spouse are the parents of 1he child. In order for a gay man to establish a legal tie 
between himself and "his" child, he is obliged to adopt the child." 
Another example of the harshness of the law towards same-sex couples, is that, while some of 
the consequences of marriage may be appropriated independently (by will, contract, or power 
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of attorney), there are others which are definitely beyond the reach of same-sex couples. 125 
These include: 
• immigration rights 
• taxation benefits 
• dependent's actions 
• rights and responsibilities in respect of children reared by the couple jointly 
• the right to enter hospitals; prisons and other places restricted to "immediate family" 
• the right to obtain health insurance, dental insurance, bereavement leave and other 
employment benefits as a "spouse" 
• the right to automatically make medical decisions in the event your "spouse" is injured 
or incapacitated (otherwise, parents, adult children or siblings are given the right) 
• the right to automatically inherit your "spouse's" property in the event he or she dies 
without a will (otherwise, it goes to parents, children and siblings). 
South Africa's new constitutional dispensation however heralds a new era in the quest for 
equality. The South African Constitution 126 is unequivocal in its acceptance of different forms 
of sexual orientation and commits the country to non-discrimination on this ground. The 
Constitutional Court127 in the certification of the Final Constitution, accepted that 
"in general, states have a duty, in terms of international human rights law, to 
protect the rights of persons freely to many and to raise a family." 
The court indicated however that 
"a survey of national constitutions in Asia, EW'OpC, North America, and Africa 
shows that the duty on the states to protect maniage and family rights has been 
interpreted in a multitude of different ways." 128 
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The court accordingly stated that 
"there has by no means been universal acceptance of the need to recognise the 
rights to marriage and to family life as being fundamental in the sense that they 
require express constitutional protection."129 
The Constitutional Court therefore endorsed the constitutional assembly's decision not to 
include right-to-marriage provisions in the Final Constitution. The court went on to state that 
the new text (the Final Constitution) would clearly prohibit any arbitrary state interference with 
the right to marry or to establish and raise a family. 130 It also held that 
"[the new text] enshrines the values of human dignity, equality, and freedom. . 
. . [and that] everyone has the right to have their dignity respected and protected. 
However these words may come to be intetpreted in future, it is evident that laws 
or executive action resulting in enforced marriages, or oppressive prohibitions 
on marriage or the choice of spouses, would not survive constitutional 
challenge. "131 
The advent of our Constitution has undoubtedly forever changed the law, and with it, the lives 
of the South African gay community. Section 9(1) of the Bill of Rights provides: 
"Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection 
and benefit of the law." 
Section_ 9(3) goes on to provide that: 
"The state may not unlawfully discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds including ... sexual orientation ... " 
In my view the common-law prohibition of same-sex marriages clearly infringes the right to 
equality generally. Albertyn & Kentridge132 distinguish formal equality from substantive 
equality. While formal equality guarantees all people equal rights within a just social order, 
substantive equality requires that we examine "the actual social and economic conditions of 
groups and individuals in order to determine whether the Constitution's commitment to equality 
is being upheld."133 The inclusion of sexual orientation as one of the listed grounds on which 
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people may not be unfairly discriminated against in terms of Section 9(3) of the Constitution 
accordingly amounts to formal equality for people of same-sex orientation. Substantive equality, 
in this context, however, would demand, for one, that people of same-sex orientation be allowed 
to many and enjoy all the legal consequences of a traditional heterosexual marriage. 134 
Substantive equality, in other words, requires the eradication of all barriers to the achievement, 
by people of same-sex orientatio~ of true equality. Albertyn & Kentridge assert that 
"a formal undemanding of equality risks undermining the deepest commitments 
of the Constitution. A substantive conception of equality, on the other hand, is 
supportive of [the Constitution's] fundamental values."135 
Albertyn & Kentridge suggest that: 
"it is ... incumbent on us to read [the equality clause] of the Bill of Rights as 
setting out a substantive conception of equality." 136 
According to Grant, a fuilure to extend marriage to same-sex couples negates the essential nature 
of the right to equality, since it is from this legal institUtion that many of the benefits flow. 137 
Same-sex couples who are denied the natural-law right to marry (each other) are specifically 
unfairly discriminated against on the ground of sexual orientation. 138 People of same-sex 
orientation fonn a constitutionally protected class and their inferior treatment by the law in the 
realm of family law generally constitutes unfair discrimination and violates the equality clause 
of our Constitution. 
The possible argument that gay and lesbian people are not really unfairly discriminated against 
because they are indeed allowed to marry- so long as they do so with a person of the opposite 
sex, 139 is a weak and circular argument as it, firstly, fails to appreciate the very essence and 
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nature of same-sex orientation and, secondly, relies exclusively on the age-old definition of 
marriage as being necessarily a different-sex institution. 140 It would be fair to say that reliance 
on the definition of marriage as a different-sex institution is linked inextricably to the idea of 
procreation and the survival of the species. The procreation argument has been discredited 
elsewhere in this dissertation. 141 
Labuschagne142 suggests that a right to enter into a same-sex marriage can be inferred from 
Section 8 of our Interim Constitution143 read together with certain other sections 144 of same 
Constitution. 
Section 8 of our Interim Constitution (the equality clause) has been retained in substantially the 
same form in section 9 of our Final Constitution in so far as it is relevant to discrimination on 
the grounds of sexual orientation. Labuschagne145 is furthermore of the view that eventual 
recognition of same-sex marriages is inevitable as a result of mainly four processes operative 
in human societies, which he describes as follows: 
a) de-religioniz.ation - the process which continuously erodes the sacred and mystical 
foundations of marriage~ 
b) de-concretization - the process which is directed at discrediting the anatomical-concrete 
view of sexual orientation and exposing the abstract and intangible nature thereof~ 
c) individualization - the process whereby marriage is developed from being a group 
concern to being an individual concern. According to this process, group morality is 
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giving way to individual or private morality; and 
d) humanization - this process generates understanding, compassion and sympathy for 
human predicaments. According to this process same-sex marriages are gradually 
elevated to socio-juridical acceptance. 
Even authors with conservative views on same-sex marriage, like Visser & Potgieter, 146 accept 
that our Bill of Rights may possibly be relied on as support for the recognition of these 
marriages. 
The equal treatment of all people and their right to enjoy the full benefit of every aspect of the 
law forms one of the cornerstones of our Constitution. Indeed, one of the constitutional 
principles 147 provides that 
"the Constitution shall prohibit racial, gender, and all other forms of 
discrimination and shall promote racial and gender equality and national mrity" 
(my emphasis). 
The preamble to our Constitution is a powerful projection of its intention, "in recognising the 
injustices of our past," to "establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights." 148 It would be shortsighted to think that this refers merely to racial 
equality. Every conceivable form of unfair discrimination, subject to the provisions of the 
limitation clause, is subject to constitutional scrutiny. 
The Constitution very much furthers the cause for same-sex marriages by providing in section 
9(5) that 
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"discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) [including 
sexual orientation of course] is unfair llllless it is established that the 
discrimination is fair." 
As the common-law prohibition of same-sex marriages amounts to discrimination on the basis 
of, especially, sexual orientation, such discrimination would be deemed to be unfair and the onus 
would lie on the state authority opposing same-sex marriages to satisfy the court that the 
limitation clause can save the prolnbition of same-sex marriages from unconstitutionality. 149 In 
order to be successful the state authority would have to convince the court of the following: 
a) The law prohibiting same-sex marriages is one of general application. 
b) The prohibition is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including: 
i) the nature of the right; 
ii) the importance of the purpose of the prohibition; 
iii) the nature and extent of the prohibition; 
iv) the relation between the prohibition and its purpose; and 
v) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
It is submitted that it would be no easy task for the party opposing same-sex marriages to 
convince the court that this righ~ namely not to be discriminated against on the basis of sexual 
orientation, when applied to a proposed same-sex marriage, ought to be limited. 
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The interpretation clauseiso of the Constitution enjoins our courts to have regard to international 
law when interpreting the provisions of our Bill of Rights, and also to have regard to the 
promotion of the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. International law, however, has not been particularly encouraging on this 
point isi It is accordingly noteworthy that the South African Constitution is the first in the world 
to expressly include sexual orientation as one of its listed grounds on which unfair 
discrimination is prohibited. The significance hereof is that the constitutional assembly, when 
drafting both the Interim and the Final Constitutions intentionally departed from the worldwide 
practice of not expressly including sexual orientation in their Constitutions. The sensible 
conclusion to be drawn from this is that couples with same-sex orientation would be afforded 
true and proper protection by our law, and not be treated in the "mickey mouse fashion'' of 
foreign jurisdictions. I submit that the constitutional assembly must have foreseen that in the 
near future the common-law prohibition of same-sex marriages would inevitably be challenged 
but they nevertheless included sexual orientation as one of the listed grounds upon which the 
state may not unfairly discriminate, in effect enjoining our courts to jealously guard this right. 
In my view all these facts bode well for a petitioner wanting to challenge the common-law 
prohibition of same-sex marriage. Furthermore any prohibition of adoption, joint custody, foster 
parenthood, artificial insemination or surrogacy arrangements by homosexual couples on 
unjustifiable and improperly substantiated grounds would accordingly be constitutionally 
challengeable. Where the spirit, purport and objects to our Bills of Rights and the basic values 
underlying our Constitution are in conflict with the view of public policy as expressed and 
applied prior to the commencement of the Constitution, then the values underlying the Bill of 
Rights must prevail. 152 
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According to Stoddard l53 
"marriage is the political issue that most fully tests the dedication of the people 
who are not gay to full equality for gay people, and it is also the issue most likely 
to lead ultimately to a world free from discrimination against lesbians and gay 
men. Marriage is much more than a relationship sanctioned by law. It is the 
centrepiece of our entire social structure, the core of the traditional notion of 
'family'. Even in its present tarnished state, the marital relationship inspires 
sentiments suggesting that it is something almost supra human. Lesbian and gay 
men are denied entry into this noble and sacred institution. The implicit message 
is this: two men or two women are incapable of achieving such an exalted 
domestic state. Gay relationships are somehow less significant, less valuable." 
This attitude is clearly in breach of the ideal of an inclusive society which our Constitution is 
committed to and in fact amounts to a denial to homosexuals of the right to be treated with 
human dignity. "Everyone bas inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected "154 
It has been suggested that the prohibition on same-sex marriages is inconsistent with the right 
to privacy, 155 which finds expression both in Section 13. of the Interim Constitution and Section 
14 of the Final Constitution. 
Hobengarten156 states that the right to privacy, which in the United States encompasses the right 
to marry, concerns choices about familial relationships. He states157 that its connection with 
sexual conduct is merely secondary, derived from this primary concem The thinking is that the 
right to privacy is the right of the individual to make his own decisions concerning his familial 
relationships, including whom to marry and whether or not to have children.. It is neither the 
business (to put it bluntly) nor the duty of the state to involve itself in these decisions. I, 
however, cannot help feeling that perhaps the privacy argument, when applied so as to suggest 
that the prohibition of same-sex marriages is inconsistent with it, has been stretched a bit too far. 
The relationship between the right to privacy and the right to marry appears to me to be far too 
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tenuous for the one concept to have any significant influence on the other. Of course the 
recognition of the right to privacy must of necessity amount to the decriminalisation of all types 
of consensual homosexual conduct in private. 158 Where however one goes so far as to equate 
the right to privacy with the right to enter into a same-sex marriage, it creates the impression that 
same-sex marriage is acceptable provided it remains a "secret" matter to be shared only by the 
parties involved. According to Cameron 159 this may also serve to re-enforce the idea that same-
sex marriage is shameful or improper and tbatit is tolerable so long as it is not exposed to public 
scrutiny. 
Katz160 argues that a claim for equality by people of same-sex orientation is more one of 
neutrality than of equality. Katz161 proposes that the state should maintain a posture of neutrality 
whenever matters involving questions of sexual orientation or gender preference are concerned. 
While accepting that there is no basis on which to. justify laws which treat homosexuals 
differently~ Katz feels that 
"1hc road to equality - whether of status or of treatment - may not lead through 
the equal prote.ction clause. but through the Constitutional guarantee of the right 
to privacy."162 
While I agree that the treatment of matters involving the issue of sexual orientation by the state 
ought to be done from a "posture of neutrality", this can only be achieved once people of same-
sex orientation are peroeived to be equal in every respect to people of opposite-sex orientation. 
In other words once they have achieved substantive equality. The fact of the matter is that 
people of same-sex orientation have been discriminated against and treated in an inferior manner 
by the state and society at large. Even prior to its constitutional entrenchment, the right to 
privacy. always fonned part of our law. 163 Yet nobody interpr~ted it so as to achieve equality for 
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people of same-sex orientation. However the equality clause of the Constitution and the 
prohibition on unfair discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation only became law with 
the adoption of the Interim Constitution. While I feel that an argument could possibly be made 
against the prohibition of same-sex marriages on the basis of the right to privacy, a far more 
convincing case would emerge if one relied rather on the equality provisions relating to unfair 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 
The landmark case of S v K164 has added fresh impetus to the argument against the prohibition 
of same-sex marriages. Although this case did not deal specifically with the issue of same-sex 
marriage, the issues it addresses strike as close to home as can be. The facts of the case are as 
follows: The accused was charged in the Knysna Magistrate's court with the crime of sodomy 
which was allegedly committed on the 10 January 1997 when the Interim Constitution was still 
in force. The crime had taken place by mutual consent between the accused and a fellow inmate 
while they had been held in custody at a Knysna prison. The accused pleaded guilty to the 
charge of sodomy and was convicted by the Magistrate and sentenced. On review to the Cape 
Provincial Division the matter was heard by Judges Farlam and Ngcobo. 
Judge Farlam appears to have researched the relevant issues well. He traced the history of the 
crime of sodomy from as far back as the third century AD up to and including the provisions 
of the Interim Constitution. 
The learned Judge acknowledged that modem research bas demonstrated that: 
"during the High Middle Ages in Europe (from the tenth to the fourteenth 
centuries) homosexual relations were treated with tolerance and understanding. 
From the fourteenth century onwards there was what Ian Corbett calls "an 
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extraordinarily rapid change of mind." Tue Christian church began to equate 
homosexual activity with heresy and those accused of it were dealt with in the 
ecclesiastical courts." 165 
What is salient here is that same-sex unions did not start out as being sinful or unlawful. 
The court also referred to Corbett's view that the church was born in the classical Europe of 
Greece and Rome, and it accepted the positive values of this culture. 166 Many Roman emperors 
were gay, most notably Hadrian, and there was no distinction in Roman law at the time between 
heterosexual and homosexual matters; rape and violence were punished equally, homosexual 
prostitution was accepted (and taxed) and boy prostitutes had the right to a legal holiday. 167 
Farlam J confirmed that, as far as could be discovered, consensual sexual acts between females 
do not constitute a crime in our common law. 168 The implication here therefore is that this 
behaviour is acceptable. 
Judge Farlam further stated: 
"[S]ection 8(2) of the Interim Constitution and section 9(3) of the 1996 
Constitution. with their specific reference to sexual orientation as a proscribed 
ground of unfair discrimination. clearly evince an intention on the part of the 
framers of the Constitution to expand the grounds of tolerance and understanding 
so that sexual activity between consenting adults is no longer subject to criminal 
sanction. I do not think that it is necessacy to invoke the constitutional 
entrenchment of the right to privacy to come to this conclusion." 1·69 
The Judge went on to hold that the presumption of unfair discrimination contained in section 
8( 4) of the Interim Constitution and section 9( 5) of the Final Constitution (which are similarly 
worded) was not and, indeed, could not be rebutted 170 
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In considering whether the unfair discrimination could be saved under the limitation clause, the 
Judge stated: 
"It is difficult to see how any discrimination which has already been stigmatised 
as 'unfair' (which is what I consider the present discrimination to be) can ever 
be regarded as permissible to the extent that it is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality."171 
The Judge however went on to survey the international position on this matter and finally 
concluded that he was satisfied that the criminal proscription of sodomy occurring between 
consenting male adults cannot be justified. Judge Farlam, with the concurrence of Judge 
N gcobo, accordingly set aside the accused' conviction and sentence. 172 
What makes this judgment a landmark decision is that, by- necessary implication, it 
decriminalizes most, if not all, of the so-called homosexual offences applicable in South Africa. 
Whether or not the crime of sodomy remains a part of our law is an issue that is extremely 
relevant to that of same-sex marriage. Admittedly the decriminalization of homosexual sexual 
activity by itself will not necessarily lead to the sudden legal approval of same-sex marriages. 
However for as long as certain homosexual sexual activity remained punishable by law, the legal 
acceptance of same-sex marriages would be that much more difficult to attain. The 
decriminalization of homosexual sexual activity is accordingly the second (the first obviously 
being the Constitution) ray of light at the end of the tunnel for the attainment of same-sex 
marriages. 
One of the most encouraging aspects of this judgment is also the court's approach to the issue. 
The court proceeded from the basis of equality rather than privacy. The court could very easily 
have found that what people of same-sex orientation did in the privacy of their closet was 
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nobody's business but their own. But the court specifically chose to deal with the matter in 
terms of the equality provisions of the Constitution. This very specific choice by the court speaks 
volumes about our judiciary's changing attitude towards people of same-sex orientation. The 
court's decision in treating the same-sex orientation issue in terms of equality adds immense 
weight to the struggle of gays and lesbians for equal treatment in family life. 
The Constitution promises a new deal for South Africa's gay community and the judgment in 
S v K is the first sign of our Constitution starting to deliver on its promise. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION. PERSONAL VIEWS. AND RECOMMENDATIQNS 
We must accept that customs change with an evolving social order. In South Africa especially, 
the advent of our Final Constitution has served to cut across the social and racial spectrum of 
the country, imposing on us the duty to extricate ourselves from our traditional prejudices and 
begin to breed a culture of human rights. This culture includes tolerance and respect for 
difference within our society. 
The time is ripe for the concept of equality among different peoples to be viewed no longer 
merely in terms of race or gender, as has traditionally been done, but in terms of sexual 
orientation as well. For far too long has the homosexual community been ostracized, rejected, 
and discriminated against, especially in the area of family law. None of the arguments which 
society has in the past used to justify its objection to homosexuality have proven to have any 
merit in them whatsoever. These arguments have always been spurious, irrational and based on 
widespread ignorance and misinformation. 
If one considers that interracial marriages were illegal for approximately forty years since 1949, 
one can be forgiven for thinking that our era of enlightenment had arrived with the abolishment 
of the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act. When the law however continues not to recognise 
same-sex marriages on spurious grounds, it makes one seriously question whether or not the law 
is based on justice for all people. People of homosexual orientation are denied the right to form 
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families (in the traditional sense of the word), as a result of discrimination against them on the 
ground of a characteristic over which they have no choice whatsoever. Will it now require a 
further forty years before society realises that it is morally wrong to treat people in this manner? 
One cannot, however, legislate away prejudice; only the persistent appeal to reason and to justice 
against the powerful pull of irrationality and bigotry can achieve that. The history of the 
struggles against slavery, religious intolerance, sexual inequality, and racial discrimination gives 
ground for believing that reason and justice eventually triumph over the darker side of human 
nature.173 
Ifwe are truly committed to building a just and democratic society, then it is wrong to pick and 
choose which forms of oppression we are going to fight against. Every person should have the 
right to be treated with dignity and respect. In other words, it should not matter whether people 
are white or black, male or female, young or old, able-bodied or disabled, heterosexual or 
homosexual. Singh174 rightly states that: 
"homosexuality in a democratic and open society requires acceptance and 
undersbmding, not judgment, censure and condemnation. Intolerance under an 
apartheid regime had become the cornerstone of the South African ethos. Now, 
rather than seeking to perpetuate this evil, our courts should strive to alleviate it. 
It is incumbent on the legal system to remove barriers to full participation by all 
people. The legal recognition of homosexual equality in matters of family 
would, ideally, confirm South Africa's commitment to full and equal justice for 
all people. In order to defend its prohibition, the state must now offer neutral 
reasons for denying same-sex marriage, which can no longer rest on traditional 
moral disapproval of homosexuality. These reasons must be those that can be 
subjected to rational empirical analysis and must be plausible." 
Some people of same-sex orientation are however against entering into traditional marriages. 175 
Ettelbrick, a strong anti-marriage proponent, feels that marriage will not liberate lesbians and 
gay men but will constrain them, make them more invisible, force their assimilation into the 
mainstream, and undermine the goals of gay liberation. 176 She further states: 
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"[A ]ttaining the right to marry will not transform our society from one that 
makes narrow, but dramatic, distinctions between those who are married and 
those who are not married to one that respects and encourages choice of 
relationships and family diversity." 177 
She feels that marriage runs contrary to two of the goals of the lesbian and gay movement: the 
affirmation of gay identity and culture and the validation of many forms of relationships. 178 In 
this most thought-provoking article, Ettelbrick' s standpoint is that the gay community will only 
truly be liberated when they are respected and accepted for their differences and the diversity 
they provide to society and that seeking the right to marry by itself will not take them there. 179 
De Vos180 also expresses the view that marriage, as it is presently structured, is a problematic 
institution in that it facilitates the oppression of women and subordinates men and women who 
choose not to marry. De Vos however acknowledges that marriage enjoys great symbolic 
significance in society and the recognition of same-sex marriages may facilitate greater social 
acceptance of same-sex relationships in general. 181 
After examining various arguments for and against gay marriage, Wolhuter182 expresses the 
view that although opponents of gay marriage raise worthy concerns, the quest for the 
recognition of gay marriages must continue. Wolhuter states that 
"[t]he accommodation of the difference between homosexual and heterosexual 
persons necessitates the recognition that, by virtue of their structural 
powerlessness, the effect of social prejudice and stigmafu.ation is experienced 
more profowdly by gays and lesbians than similar social prejudice would be 
experienced by members of more dominant social groups." 183 
There will always be arguments for and against marriage as an institution. People are 
individuals and they will always be affected by, and treat, a marital relationship individually. 
Marriage will work for some people and not for others, irrespective of their sexual orientation. 
That is the nature of the marital relationship. 
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At this stage of our social order, lesbian and gay people ought to have the right to marry, for no 
other reason, than to elevate their relationship to a "first-class" status, which is how society 
generally perceives a traditional marriage relationship to be. While Paula Ettelbrick may 
disagree with me, I believe that forcing society to deal with the issue of same-sex marriages is 
the start of persuading them to shed their prejudices on the issue. 
According to Hohengarten, 184 marriage provides a legal framework for a committed relationship 
between two adults, a framework that cannot be duplicated by other legal forms. When two 
individuals marry they enter into a legally binding relationship with each other. This 
relationship is binding because the state imposes significant conditions on exiting it; a spouse 
cannot simply walk away from the marriage. Marriage thus offers a legal medium through 
which two adults can make a mutual commitment to stay together. This mutual commitment 
functions as a relatively stable basis upon which they can structure aspects of their life together 
and their joint interactions with third parties. Marriage allows a couple to overcome the deep-
seated individualism of contemporary life and to operate, for many purposes, as a unit. Marriage 
is important for same-sex couples' freedom of intimate association because it is a formalised 
legal status that recognises their union and commitment. 185 186 
The unconventional lifestyle of homosexuals is no justification for the continuation of the status 
quo. People cannot truly be regarded as being free if society imposes unjust, unnecessary and 
unreasonable limits on them. It is high time that society accepted that there is nothing 
intrinsically wrong about homosexuality. Lesbians and gay men are born with the sexual and 
emotional preference that they possess. It is as much a part of their psyche as heterosexuality 
is to heterosexuals. It is not something that can or even should be "cured". What ought to 
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happen is that lesbians and gay men be respected for who they are and treated as equals in every 
sense of the word. 
For lesbian and gay people, nothing less than the full recognition of their right to marry would 
truly give effect to the promise of our Constitution that they will not be discriminated against 
on the ground of their sexual orientation_ 
Legally recognised cohabitation for people of same-sex orientation may be a viable proposition. 
This would entail legal recognition of same-sex unions along the lines of registered partnership 
arrangements which exist in countries like Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. 
However, while such a development would greatly improve the present social and familial 
situation oflesbians and gay men, I do not believe that it will be enough. By implication, lesbian 
and gay people would not enjoy full and equal rights as two heterosexual spouses would If they 
did then there would be nothing to distinguish marriage from this type of cohabitation. Besides, 
our law relating to the rights and social status of cohabitants generally would need to change 
swiftly to bring it in line with that of marriage. And if legally recognised cohabitation is brought 
in line with marriage, then what compelling reason can there be for excluding gays and lesbians 
to the institution of marriage itself? 
While the next logical step for heterosexual cohabitants may be to strive for full recognition by 
the law for their relationship, I do not consider that this can be sufficient for same-sex 
cohabitants. The ultimate recognition for same-sex couples would be for the law to allow them 
to marry (in the traditional sense of the word) their partners. Anything less than the right to 
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marry would amount to mere legal tolerance of same-sex couples and not to full recognition and 
acceptance of them as individuals in their own right. What is being advocated here is 
egalitarianism among individuals, irrespective of their sexual orientation. Should lesbians and 
gay men choose not to marry, and many of them probably would, then that would be their 
prerogative. 
The fact that same-sex marriage may be anathema to certain sectors of the community - for 
whatever reason - does not entitle the members of that community to dictate to the state and to 
impose their beliefs on others who do not subscribe thereto. Accordingly there should be equal 
treatment of people of different sexual orientation and unfair discrimination must not be 
allowed. 187 
People of same-sex orientation are entitled to an equal place in the sun and it is a blight upon 
so-called civilised society that these people are stigmatised and that the less courageous have to 
live a lie, while the more courageous are social outcasts. 1118 
To conclude I would recommend the following: 
a) The anti-homosexual attitudes which are deeply embedded in our culture and which 
have led to social prejudices against homosexuals must be eradicated. It is the duty of 
the law to take the lead in doing so. When eventually called upon to do so, our courts 
should be courageous enough to make a finding in favour of same-sex marriages, 
whereafter other advanced legal systems will hopefully follow suit. 
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b) Judges who continue to suffer from judicial homophobia must recuse themselves from 
matters involving such issues, alternatively they must educate themselves with a view 
to overcoming their homophobia. 
c) The institution and legal definition of "marriage" must be reformulated to include 
admittance by gay couples. 
d) Children ought to receive proper sex-education at school level, which must include 
education on homosexuality as an accepted alternative form of sexual orientation. This 
would help to rid our future generations of the prejudices that most of us possess today. 
e) The government must speak out explicitly and publicly against the different forms of 
anti-homosexual discrimination. The subject of homosexuality and gay rights must be 
publicised and debated, rather than continue to be whispered about behind closed doors. 
f) Local churches must join the struggle against homophobia by becoming open and 
affirming communities of new life and commitment for all people, regardless of their 
sexual orientation. The church in accordance with the Christian ethos of unconditional 
love and justice must affirm the basic human right oflesbians and gay men to marry. 
The recognition and prot.ecti.on by the law of same-sex marriages would be a benediction for the 
many millions of lesbians and gay men of this land It would however continue to amount to 
blasphemy for the still many narrow-minded and unenlightened people who cling to their 
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prejudices unreasoningly. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu ts9 has stated, 
"we reject [gay and lesbian people], treat them as pariahs, and push them outside 
the confines of our church communities, and thereby we negate the consequences 
of their baptism and ours. We make them doubt that they are children of God, 
and this must nearly be the ultimate blasphemy." 
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